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Professional Responsibility
Warren L. Mengis*

I.

CAN A TRIANGLE BE FAIR AND SQUARE?

Rule 1.7 of the Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct begins with this
sentence: "Loyalty is an essential element in the lawyers relationship to a
client."' The task force of the Louisiana State Bar Association which submitted
these rules to the Louisiana Supreme Court for its approval thought this sentence
so important that it took it out of the comments where it is found in the
American Bar Association rules of professional conduct and put it into the black
letter rule of 1.7. It is the writer's intent to explore this element of loyalty in the
relationships created by an insurance policy which imposes upon the insurer the
duties of defense and indemnification. One author has termed this relationship
"the eternal triangle."' The problem of course -is whether the lawyer has one
client or two. If we say that the lawyer has but one client, whether the insured
or the insurer, we are ignoring practical reality. On the other hand, if we say
that the lawyer has two clients, then there must be a perfect commonality of
interest, or the lawyer finds himself in an impossible situation, because being
perfectly loyal to one client would evidence disloyalty to the other.
Another force on the Louisiana attorney's duty of loyalty is the Direct
Action Statute.3 All of the articles which the writer has been able to find
concerning this ethical dilemma have considered the problem in the context of
suits involving only one defendant, the insured. The existence of insurance and
the limits thereof are normally kept from the jury, and the second duty of the
insurance company, "indemnity," is a true indemnification after a judgment has
been rendered against the insured. In Louisiana, because of the Direct Action
Statute, an insured is very seldom the only defendant. Almost inevitably the
insurance company is joined as a solidary obligor. In addition, the instances in
which an insurer may be sued alone are very limited. It is not then a question
of later indemnification, but of a judgment directly against the insurance
company as well as a judgment against the insured. In performing its first duty,
the insurance company does in fact select the attorney to defend not just the
insured, but both insured and insurer. This attorney makes an appearance on
behalf of both defendants. Under this scenario it is impossible to say that the
attorney represents one or the other, but not both. And it is likewise impossible
to say that one of the clients is primary and that the other client is secondary.
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1. La. R.S. ch. 4, app., art. 15, rule 1.7 (1988).
2. Brooke Wunnicke, The Eternal Triangle: Standards of Ethical Representation by the
Insurance Lawyer, 31 For the Def., Feb. 1989, at 7.
3. La. R.S. 22:655 (Supp. 1993).
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In the states which do not have a Direct Action Statute, any one of three
positions could be strongly supported: (1) the attorney represents the insurance
company only, which hired him.; (2) The attorney represents both the insurance
company which hired him and the insured by virtue of the contract of insurance;
and (3) the attorney represents only the insured even though the insurance
company is paying his fee.
Professor L. Ray Patterson in his textbook on legal ethics 4 solves the
problem analytically in this fashion:
The lawyer represents the insurer as a primary client; The lawyer
represents the insured as a derivative client. This is because the
insured's relationship with the lawyer is derived by way of the insured's
relationship with the insurer. Thus, the rights and duties of the lawyer
in relation to the insured are determined by the insurer's rights and
duties to the insured. This means, of course, that the lawyer's rights
and duties in relation to 'the insured are the same of those of the
insurer.5
If there was always a perfect commonality of interest between the insurance
company and the insured, this analytical solution would probably work. We
know, however, that this is not correct, and that there are many situations which
give rise to various and serious conflicts of interest between the insured and the
insurer, the most common of which is the question of coverage. Because the
usual insurance policy covers "accidents" or "negligence," but does not insure
against intentional acts, the insurer prefers the act framed as an intentional one,
whereas the insured, of course, does not. Another conflict involves the insurance
company's quite rational desire to put out as little money as possible and the
insured's desire that the matter be settled within policy limits. On the other
hand, with professional people, whether doctors, lawyers, accountants, or others,
you may have the insured wishing to vindicate himself by trial at all costs and
the insurance company desiring to settle. In some instances you find the exact
reverse of this situation with the professional desiring to settle quietly and
without undue damage to his reputation, but the insurance company not being
willing to put out "top dollar."6 It is not the purpose of the writer to examine
all of the many conflicts which can exist between an insurer and the insured, but
to examine the Louisiana authorities to see how the conflict should be ethically
resolved.
We first look to Louisiana model rules of professional responsibility and find
that Rules 1.7, 1.8(B) and 1.8(F) are pertinent. The writer's aware that
application of these rules to the interrelationship among a liability insurer, its
insured, and the attorney chosen by the insured has been described as "awk-

4. L. Ray Patterson, Legal Ethics: The Law of Professional Responsibility (2d ed. 1984).
5. Id. at 160.
6. Gibson v. Western Fire, 682 P.2d 725 (Mont. 1984).
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ward." 7 The same court termed such relationships as "sui generis. '8 This is
of no help to the insurance defense lawyer who finds himself on the horns of the
dilemma. He does not want to guess at the proper ethical solution, but rightly
expects to have some definite guideline which will avoid disloyalty to either
client and at the same time protect him from charges of bad faith and possible
malpractice claims.
If Louisiana did not have the Direct Action Statute, we could simply
embrace the one client theory, i.e., that the one client is the insured, and the
attorney would show absolute loyalty to that client, even though the attorney is
paid by the insurance company which is ethically permitted to do so. Since
Professor John K. Morris published his article on this question in 198 1,9 the one
client view has certainly caught on. 0 This view also has the endorsement of
the American Bar Association in its Opinion Number 282 rendered in 1950. The
opinion first discusses the relationship existing between the insurance company
and the insurer as follows:
From an analysis of their respective undertakings it is evident at the
outset that a community of interest exists between the company and the
insured growing out of the contract of insurance with respect to any
action brought by a third person against the insured within the policy
limitations. The company and the insured are virtually one in their
common interest. The requirement that the insurance shall defend any
such action contemplates that the company, because of its contractual
liability and community of interest, shall take charge of the incidence
of such defense including the supervising of the litigation. Whenever
the insured is served with the court process as defendant, the contract
of insurance expressly requires him to forward such process to the
company so that the company may provide the means of defense. It is
elemental that this includes retaining and compensating a lawyer at the
company's expense."
The opinion goes on to discuss the 1908 Canons of Ethics, particularly
Canon 6, and concludes that the essential point of ethics involved is that the
lawyers so employed shall represent the insured as his client with undivided
fidelity. 2 This same opinion, however, accepts unequivicably that a lawyer

7. Moritz v. Medical Protective Co., Etc., 428 F. Supp. 865 (W.D. Wis. 1977).
8. Id. at 872.
9. John K. Morris, Conflicts of Interest in Defending Under Liability Insurance Policies: A
Proposed Solution, 1981 Utah L. Rev. 457.
10. Rebecca White Berch, Insurer-Insured Conflicts: Can Insurer-retained Council Be True to
the Insured?, 23 Land & Water L. Rev. 185 (1988) and Robert E. O'Malley, Ethics Principles for
the Insurer, the Insured, and Defense Council: The Eternal Triangle Reformed, 66 Tul. L. Rev. 511
(1991).
11. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 282 (1950).
12. Id.
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may ethically undertake dual representation of the insurer and the insured. 3 In
1981, however, the ABA issued Informal Opinion 1476 which states "when a
liability insurer retains a lawyer to defend an insured, the insured is the lawyer's
client."' 4 The best that can be said of the ABA position is that either view is
ethically correct. Writers on ethics who have considered this triangular
relationship have concluded that the jurisprudence by and large has followed the
dual representation standard. 5
Since there is no way that a Louisiana insurance defense lawyer can claim
that he represents only the insured when he has in fact signed his pleadings on
behalf of both the insured and the insurer as a result of the Direct Action Statute,
we must look to the ethical rules on dual representation. It is equally true that
the Louisiana insurance defense lawyer cannot consider the insurance company
the primary client and the insured the secondary client or vice versa. They are
both his clients, and to each he owes a duty of undivided loyalty.
Rule 1.7 of the Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct provides as follows:
Loyalty is an essential element in the lawyer's relationship to a client.
Therefore:
(a) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that
client will be directly adverseto another client, unless:
(1) The lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not
adversely affect the relationship with the other client; and
(2) Each client consents after consultation.
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that
client may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to
another client or to a third person, or by the lawyer's own interests,
unless;
(1) The lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not
be adversely affected; and
(2) The client consents after consultation. When representation of multiple clients in a single matter is undertaken, the
consultation shall include explanation of the implications of the
common representation and the advantages and risks
6
involved.'
Rule 1.8(b) provides as follows:
(b) A lawyer shall not use information relating to representation of a
client to the disadvantage of the client unless consents after consultation."

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id.
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1476 (1981).
Charles W. Wolfrom, Modern Legal Ethics 430 (1986) and Wunnicke, supra note 2.
La. R.S. ch. 4 app., art. 16, rule 1.7 (1988).
La. R.S. ch. 4 app., art. 16, rule 1.8(b) (1988).
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Rule 1.8(f) provides:
(f)A lawyer shall not accept compensation for representing a client
from one other than the client unless:
(1) The client consents after consultation, or the compensation
is provided by contract with a third person such as an insurance contract or a prepaid legal service plan.
(2) There is no interference with the lawyer's independent or
professional judgment or with the client/lawyer relationships;
and
(3)
Information relating to representation of a client is
protected as required by Rule 1.6.18
Obviously Louisiana Rule 1.7, which is the general conflicts article, deserves
our primary focus. Professor Monroe Freedman in his textbook, Understanding
Lawyers' Ethics, points out that the provisions of 1.7(a) are redundant and that
actually all we have to look at are the provisions of 1.7(b).1 9 He concludes that
"there is a conflict of interest whenever 'the representation of [a] client maybe
materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a third
person, or by the lawyer's own interests."' 2 0 He goes on to point out, however,
that the conflict of interest is waivable if two conditions are met.
First, the client must consent, knowingly and voluntarily, to limit the
representation to the extent required by the conflict. Second, the lawyer
must reasonably believe that the client has fully understood the
implications of the conflict and that the representation, as limited, will
not be adversely affected by the conflict in any way that has not been
consented to by the client.2'
In view of the tremendous number of cases in other jurisdictions regarding
the conflict of interest which the insurance defense lawyer may have, it is
surprising to discover that Louisiana has very few reported cases on the subject.
And more than half of these cases are from the Federal Court. One of the
reasons for this may be the continued working of the case by the insurance
company officials or adjusters. They deal directly with the plaintiff's lawyer in
negotiation and also continue to deal directly with their insured. The insurance
22
defense lawyer is "outside the circle.
In 1974, the professional responsibility Committee of the Louisiana State Bar
Association was asked to give its opinion as to the propriety of the following:

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

La. R.S. ch. 4 app., art. 16, rule 1.8(0 (1988).
Monroe H. Freedman, Understanding Lawyers' Ethics 191-92 (1990).
Id. at 190 (quoting Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.7(b) (1983)).
Id.
Maryland Cas. Co. v. Dixie Ins. Co., 622 So. 2d 698 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1993).
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"Where the insurereither denies coverage to the insured orreserves its
rights to do so subsequently,may the
same attorney properly represent
23
both the insured and the insurer?"
The Committee answered the question in this fashion:
Under the circumstances presented, the Committee is of the opinion
that it would be improper, with or without the consent of all parties
concerned, for the same attorney to represent both the insurer and the
insured.
The Committee is compelled to this conclusion based upon its
belief that once the insurer decides to assert a coverage defense, the
same attorney may not represent both the insured and the insurer.
Canon 5 and, to some extent, Canon 7, would militate against such dual
representation. EC 5-1 provides that the attorney's professional
judgment should be exercised "solely for the benefit of his client and
free of compromising influences and loyalties," including "interests of
other clients." EC 5-14 states that an attorney cannot represent two
clients with "conflicting, inconsistent, diverse, or otherwise discordant"
interests. And EC 5-15 indicates that counsel "should resolve all doubts
against the propriety of the representation."
The Committee feels that when coverage is disputed, the interests
of the insured and the insurer are always divergent. The attorney
should not be placed in the position of divided loyalties. Such an
arrangement would be adverse to the best interests of the insured, the
insurer, the attorney, and the profession.24
In 1976 the Louisiana Association of Defense Counsel applied to the
Supreme Court of Louisiana for a review of Opinion 342. In a one line ruling
the Supreme Court stated: "Application denied. There is no error in Opinion
342. "2 In the meantime, Judge Alvin Rubin in Storm Drilling Co. v. Atlantic
Richfield Corp. quoted Opinion 342 with approval even though it was issued
after the fact took place in Storm Drilling.26 Judge Rubin concluded that
Opinion 342 simply stated ethical principles that had been established long
before. As he put it: "It is fundamental to the position of an advocate in an
advisory system that is loyalty to his client be undivided. The lawyer's duty to
his client is fiduciary in nature. He is, literally his client's attorney at law, agent,
advocate, and champion. 27

23. Louisiana State Bar Association Comm. on Professional Responsibility, Op. 342 (1974) (italics
in original).
24. Id.
25. In re'Louisiana Association of Defense Counsel, 338 So. 2d 294 (La. 1976).
26. Storm Drilling Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Corp., 386 F. Supp. 830, 832 (E.D. La. 1974).
27. Id. at 831-32.
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Perhaps one of the cases which led to Opinion 342 is Shehee-Ford Wagon
& Harness Co. v. ContinentalCasualty Co.,28 a Second Circuit Court of Appeal
case decided by Judge Hamiter in 1936. In that case the insured, Shehee-Ford
Wagon & Harness Co., was suing its own insurer Continental Casualty Company
for failing to defend it properly in the prior damage case and that the insured was
compelled to employ counsel and defend itself separately. In the original
damage suit, Franklin Jones sued Shehee-Ford and Continental Casualty
Company alleging their liability and solido. Continental provided counsel who
answered on behalf of both defendants, but also filed exceptions of prematurity
and no-cause of action. The company in these exceptions contended that it was
not liable because it had not received the notice required from its insured under
the policy and also that the driver of the insured's automobile was an independent contractor and not an employee. The trial court overruled both exceptions
and found both defendants liable in solido. Both defendants then appealed
through counsel provided by the insurance company. The second circuit
affirmed as to Shehee-Ford, but found Continental not liable because of the lack
of notice required by the policy. It was at this point that the interest of the two
defendants diverged. Shehee through separate counsel that it had been forced to
obtain asked for a rehearing in the second circuit which motion for rehearing was
opposed by a counsel originally retained to represent both defendants. The
motion was denied, and Shehee applied to the Louisiana Supreme Court for
writs. Original counsel then attempted to obtain a dismissal or recall of the
writs. After reciting all the above facts, the court said:
The entire record in the prior suit, which is a part of the record in this
proceeding, and the progress of the case which we have endeavored to
above outline, graphically reveal that the insurer's primary purpose in
defending the action was to free itself of liability, irrespective of the
fate that might befall the insured. It is true that it presented the defense
of independent contractorship for the insured in the various courts which
considered the case; but it is likewise true that such insurer would have
escaped liability had that defense been finally sustained. And, while
defending on that ground, insurer was also seriously urging that it was
not liable under the policy, even though the insured might be liable to
Jones. It appears to us that these defenses, in so far as insured was
concerned, were inconsistent, one with the other. It was the duty of the
insurance company to either deny its obligation to the insured, and rely
on that defense, or to recognize the policy as being in full force and
effect and give to insured its undivided support.29

28. 170 So. 249 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1936).
29. Id. at 251-52.
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The court went on to award to the plaintiff $500 as reimbursement. for its
legal expenses. 30
In 1968, Judge Albert Tate authored the opinion in Brasseaux v. Girouard
in which he reviewed the jurisprudence throughout the United States concerning
a lawyers obligation not to represent different interests which are hostile or in
conflict with one another in the same law suit and concluded that when the
lawyer in violation of this principal does find himself representing conflicting
interest, the court in which the proceeding is pending should disqualify
counsel. 3' In the following paragraph he gave the reasons assigned for this
disqualification rule:
Reasons assigned for the fairly strict disqualification principle followed
by all American jurisdictions in which the issue has arisen, having
included its necessity in order to encourage maximum disclosure by
clients to counsel of all relevant facts, without fear of future adverse use
of this confidence. The courts also express as rationale that public
confidence in the legal profession as a whole might otherwise be
impaired. For these reasons of public policy, the general rule is that
doubts in borderline cases should be resolved in favor of disqualification, with the important injunction being reiterated that, for these
reasons, even the appearance of conflict should be avoided.32
The specific conflict of interests in Brasseaux v. Girouard concerned
counsel's previous representation of both the insured and its insurer, and a
conflict that arose thereafter. The facts did not indicate that the former client,
the insured, had either actually or tacitly waived the conflict, and consequently
he retained the right to urge disqualification of the attorney. In a footnote, Judge
Tate referred to Opinion 102 of the Professional Responsibility Committee of the
Louisiana State Bar Association. Opinion 102 is a landmark in which the
Professional Responsibility Committee stated that it was never proper for one
attorney to represent both the driver of an automobile and the guest passenger.
From the opinion, it would appear that many lawyers prior to the issuance of
Opinion 102 did not consider it unethical to represent both the driver and the
guest passenger. The Committee, however, was very firm in its view that such
33
representation could never be undertaken regardless of consent.
In 1972, the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal was confronted with a
most unusual question: could a former client, the insured, subpena the entire file
of the attorney who had represented both the insured and the insurer in the prior

30.
31.
32.
33.
(1964).

Id. at 253.
214 So. 2d 401, 404-06 (La. 1968).
Id. at 406.
Louisiana State Bar Association Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Op. 102
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litigation?
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company was seeking
writs to annul a subpena duces tecum. The Court, through Judge Landry, stated
that it was faced with an apparently res nova situation.35 The attorney whose
records were sought to be subpoenaed had formally represented the insured and
the insurer pursuant to a contract of insurance and allegedly failed to settle
within the policy limits when he could have and should have done so. It is
obvious that the present plaintiff hoped to be able to establish from the attorney's
own file that he had received offers to settle within the policy limits and even
negligently or improvently did not do so. Judge Landry concluded:
We believe in elementary that the client is entitled to the benefit of the
opinions, conclusions and theories of his attorney or expert as may be
reflected from the contents of the attorney's or expert's file. We deem
it equally basic that an attorney or expert may not be permitted to
withhold any information that would adversely affect the legal rights of
a client or employer on the ground that it would disclose the attorney's
or expert's opinions or conclusions concerning the rights of another
client whom the attorney represented simultaneously in the same matter.
Under such circumstances, it is our opinion that the attorney must
disclose to either client all opinions, conclusions and theories regarding
the client's rights and position, even in communications to other parties
whom the attorney also represented in the same matter. Certainly it is
the attorney'sduty to fully inform each client, that is what the attorney
is engaged to do, and especially if there exists a slightest conflict of
36
interest.
This is perhaps an area of practice where attorneys fall short having been
hired and paid by the insurer, it is nothing less than human to keep the insurer
advised of all details, but at the same time to neglect passing on information to
the insured. As stated in United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Louis A.
Roser Co.:
Even the most optimistic view of human nature requires us to realize
that an attorney employed by an insurance company will slant his
efforts, perhaps unconsciously, in the interest of his real client-the one
who is paying his fee and from whom he hopes to receive future
business-the insurance company.37
The same view is echoed in Purdy v. Pacific Automobile Insurance
Company, wherein the court said,

34.
35.
36.
37.

Cousins v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 258 So. 2d 629 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972).
Id. at 635.
Id. at 35-36 (emphasis added).
U.S. Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. Louis A. Roser Co., 585 F.2d 932, 938 n.5 (8th Cir. 1978).
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[T]he "triangular" aspect of the representation afforded the insured by
the insurer's lawyers is described as a coalition for a common purpose,
a favorable disposition of the claim-with the attorneys owing duties to
both clients. As a practical matter, however, there has been recognition
that, in reality, the insurer's attorneys may have closer ties with the
insurer and a more compelling interest in protecting the insurer's
position, whether or not it coincides with what is best for the insured. 38
One of the latest cases in Louisiana dealing with this triangular relationship
is Dugas Pest Control of Baton Rouge, Inc. v. Mutual Fire,Marine and Inland
Insurance Company.39 In this case the original action was brought by the
vendees of a residence, the Raglands, against the sellers, the Viators, Dugas Pest
Control and its insurer The Mutual Fire, Marine and Inland Insurance Company.
Mutual provided a defense, but at the same time denied coverage. Apparently
Dugas was given no indication that Mutual was going to provide it with anything
less than a complete defense. But on the second day of trial, Mutual's counsel
informed Dugas that Mutual was going to deny coverage. The trial court
rendered a judgment against all three, and Mutual, on behalf of itself and Dugas,
along with the Viators, filed a motion for a new trial. In the motion filed by
Mutual it claimed that Dugas had not introduced any policy of insurance and that
therefore no insurance coverage was established. It was at this point that Dugas
retained its own independent counsel. On the ruling for a new trial, the court
noted that Mutual's counsel still represented Dugas at the time, had created an
apparent conflict of interests and stated, "To deny Dugas the opportunity to
establish coverage where his own attorney in trial is now denying coverage
would be a gross injustice and will not be countenanced by this court. '40 At
the new trial coverage was established, and only the Viators appealed, contending
that they should not have been liable but that Dugas should have been solely
responsible. Dugas' independent counsel represented Dugas in this appeal which
was lost by the Viators. This lawsuit followed in which Dugas Pest Control
sought reimbursement of attorney's fees. Mutual maintained that it fully satisfied
its obligation to defend Dugas and gave Dugas a complete defense at the trial.
The court found that and insurer is obligated to provide a defense unless the
allegations of the petition unambiguously exclude coverage. The court then cited
Opinion 342 of the Louisiana State Bar Association's Committee on Professional
Ethics and Grievances and found that a conflict existed where an insurer owed
a defense, but was also denying coverage.4' The court pointed out that cases
which had held that an insured might openly deny coverage and still provide a
defense, did not address the ethical considerations involved and were therefore

38.
39.
40.
41.

157 Cal. App. 3d 59, 76 (1984).
504 So. 2d 1051 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1987).
Id. at 1053.
Id. at 1054.
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not controlling. It then concluded that if the insurer chooses to represent the
insured but deny coverage, it must employ separate counsel. If it fails to do so,
the insurer is liable
for the attorney fees and costs the insured may incur for
42
defending the suit.
The court went on to find that on the motion for a new trial, while Mutual's
attorney was also supposedly representing Dugas, the conflict of interests
developed in connection with the failure of that same lawyer to produce the
policy on behalf of Dugas. Even thereafter, Mutual continued to breach its
obligation to defend by not defending Dugas against the appeal of the Viators.
The court affirmed the granting of attorney's fees and costs incurred by
Dugas.43
Another interesting case concerning a refusal to defend is Ezell v. Hayes Oil
Field Construction Co. Inc." An employee brought a Jones Act claim against
the employer, Hayes Oil Field Construction Co. and USF & G offered to defend
Hayes but under a reservation of rights and also agreed to compensate Hayes for
its expenses in defending the suit. Hayes was unsatisfied with both of these
offers and filed a third party complaint against USF & G seeking attorney's fees
and punitive damages for failure to defend. USF & G had refused to assume
Hayes' defense in the action because (1) the geographical limitations of Hayes'
policy excluded coverage for accidents outside of Mississippi, (2) Hayes
misrepresented the nature of its business in its application for insurance, and (3)
Hayes and USF & G had available conflicting defenses. The jury awarded
$2,244.26 in attorney's fees and $2 million (reduced by remittitur to $500,000)
in punitive damages. The court pointed out that both Mississippi and Louisiana
did not allow punitive damages for a reasonable refusal to defend. The court
then concluded that a serious conflict of interests between the insurer and the
insured would be reasonable ground for the insurer to decline the defense. The
court said,
The right of the insured to have the insurer assume the defense,
however, further requires that the insurer and the insured have no
conflict of interests. Here the insurer and the insured had a conflict:
Hayes did not have coverage under the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act, making a defense that Ezell, the original
plaintiff, was a longshoreman acceptable to USF & G but unacceptable
to Hayes. In the presence of such a conflict, the insured has only the
right to demand that the insurer assume the defense under a reservation
of rights. Because Hayes was not willing to do this, USF & G was
justified in refusing to assume the defense.4

42. Id. at 1054-55.
43. Id. at 1055.
44. 693 F. 2d. 489 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, Hayes Oilfield Const. Co. v. United Sates
Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 464 U.S. 818, 104 S. Ct. 79 (1983).
45. Id. at 494 (emphasis in original).
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As we have seen from Opinion 342, in such a situation the same attorneys
cannot represent both insurer and insured, but insurer remains liable for the cost
of defense. In the cases prior to the adoption of the Code of Professional
Responsibility in 1970, the decisions tended to stress the rights of the insured and
the rights of the insurer under the contract of insurance. The ethical problems
of the lawyers simply were either not mentioned at all or not stressed. As
pointed out in Clemmons v. Zurich General Accident and Liability Insurance
Company,46 an insurer usually owes a defense to the insured even when the
third party cause of action is groundless or fraudulent. But this duty to defend
should not foreclose the question of coverage. Accordingly, the insurer may
require the execution of a non-waiver agreement whereby the insurer agrees to
defend and the insured recognizes the right of the insurance company to question
coverage; or, the insurer may bring an action against the insured for a declaratory
judgment on the question of coverage. In the first instance, the insured is not
required to sign. In the second instance, the insured is not entitled to attorney's
fees for defending the action. The court then recognized that the dilemma is
compounded in Louisiana because an action by an injured party may be directed
jointly against the insurer and the insured in which case there may arise a
conflict of interest between the insurance company and its insured. It certainly
does not seem appropriate for the insurance company to file either separately or
in the same suit an action for declaratory judgment against its insured to
determine coverage. In Wisconsin, which is the only other state which has a
Direct Action Statute,47 it is declared to be the public policy of Wisconsin that
an insurance company may not bring a separate declaratory judgment action
because one of the policies of the legislature in adopting the Direct Action
Statute was to compel that all issues arising in the negligent action, including
insurance policy coverage, be determined in a single action. 48 It is difficult to
see how an insured would feel comfortable with a defense provided by the
insurer when the insurer at the same time is attempting to establish in a second
or separate suit that no coverage exists. It would be particularly unnerving if the
court should order the consolidation of the two suits. From a judicially economy
standpoint, however, the consolidation of the two suits could seem to be the
proper course. The appearance of impropriety has generally been solved by
having different attorneys chosen by the insurer for coverage questions as
distinguished from the defense. It is believed that one of the reasons we do not
have many recent cases in Louisiana involving a coverage conflict is because the
insurance defense bar insists that the insurer retain them either for the purpose
of defense or for the purpose of contesting coverage, but not both.

46. 230 So. 2d 887 (La. App. 1st. Cir. 1969).
47. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 803.04(2) (West 1977).
48. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Charneski, 286 F.2d. 238 (4th Cir. 1960) and American Motorist Ins. Co.
v. Trane Co., 544 F. Supp. 669, 696 n.21 (1982), affd, 718 F.2d 842 (7th Cir. 1983).

1994]

PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

"The dual-client doctrine is a confusing and increasingly useless anachronism. It is unsound as a matter of policy, law, and legal ethics. 49 It was this
sentence that prompted the writer to look at the dual-client doctrine in the light
of Louisiana's Direct Action Statute.50 Mr. Robert E. O'Malley who wrote the
two sentences is identified in his article as Vice Chairman and Loss Prevention
Counsel, Attorney's Liability Assurance Society, Inc. in Chicago, Illinois. He
goes on to say in the very next sentence that "the insured should be deemed to
be the only client of defense counsel in every case."'5 As long as there is no
direct action statute and the insurance company is not made a solidary obligor
with the insured, the writer finds absolutely nothing wrong with the position
taken by Mr. O'Malley and also the position taken by Professor Morris. 5 2 In
fact, it seems to be the ethical solution of choice. This would obviously do away
with the "independent counsel" rule which has grown by leaps and bounds
according to Mr. Ronald E. Mallon in the January 1986 Insurance Counsel
Journal.53 He suggests that
[tihe area for ethical clarification is the perception that present or past
business relationships with an insurer provide a basis for disqualification
because of the risk that counsel will subjectively favor the interest of
that client. Considering the many attorneys affective by developing
"independent counsel" rule, a specific ethical provision would be
appropriate. One approach would be to propose an addition to rule 1.8
(for the jurisdiction's comparable provision to Canon 5) as follows:
(4) A lawyer shall not represent both an insurer and its
insured if a coverage issued exists which may affect the quality
of the lawyer's representation unless the lawyer's retention is
limited solely to the defense of the liability claims.
Mr. Mallon goes on to argue that the insurance industry as well as insurance
defense bar should work to dispel any vestige of the belief that appointed counsel
will primarily represent the interest of the insurer. He believes that the
perception can be overcome by relatively minimal efforts of insurance defense
lawyers. Person contact by that lawyer with the insured and a pattern of
communication would tend to convince the insured that the appointed attorney
is able and would fully protect his interests.54 Hopefully, this trend of enhanced
communication has occurred in Louisiana and has consequently forestalled the

49. O'Malley, supra note 10, at 512.
50. For a complete history and analysis of the Louisiana Statute , see Alston Johnson, The
Louisiana Direct Action Statute, 43 La. L. Rev. 1455 (1983).
51. Id. (emphasis in original).
52. Morris, supra note 9.
53. Ronald E. Mallon, A New Definition of Insurance Defense Counsel, 53 Ins. Couns. J. 108
(1986).
54. Id. at 152-53.
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possibility of those many insurance cases otherwise riddled with conflicts of
interests.
II. CONCLUSION

Until there is some change in our model rules or in the direct action statute,
it would appear that the Louisiana insurance defense attorney must represent both
the insurance company and the insured and is ethically obligated to protect the
interests of each. If during the representation, the interest of the two clients
diverge, then the lawyer must analyze the situation to see whether his responsibilities to one of the clients would materially limit his responsibility to the other.
Once he comes to that conclusion, it is the opinion of the writer that he must
make full disclosure to each. If both clients thereafter consent to the continued
representation and the lawyer reasonably believes that he can continue to
representation without any adverse affect, then he may do so. Otherwise he must
withdraw. This possibility does not prevent the insurance company and the
lawyers selected by it from agreeing ahead of time that the lawyer would only
handle the defense and will not report to the company anything concerning
coverage or lack thereof. This approach avoids the serious ethical dilemma of
working for and against the insured at the same time. 55

55. Employers Casualty Company v. Tilley, 496 S.W.2d 552 (Tx. 1973) and Parsons v.
Continental National American Group, 550 P.2d 94 (Az. 1976).

